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RUBY:

From Schwartz Media I’m Ruby Jones this is 7am.

In recent months senior Australian politicians have talked openly about a potential military conflict with China over Taiwan.

Archival tape -- Peter Dutton:

“Every major city in Australia, including Hobart, is within range of China’s missiles.”

RUBY:

The increasingly tense rhetoric follows a series of incursions by China into Taiwanese air and naval space.

Archival tape -- News:

“Thirty nine PLA jets flew into Taiwan's airspace on Sunday. It's the biggest incursion in the last few months”

RUBY:

Now, China’s leaders are closely watching the current crisis in Ukraine, looking for clues as to how the US might react towards Chinese aggression in the Pacific.

Archival tape -- News:

“Analyst in the Biden administration increasingly believe that China is gauging the US's response to the Ukrainian crisis as a proxy for how the US would deal with China's increased military build-up in the Taiwan Strait.”

RUBY:

Today, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University Hugh White, on the changing power dynamics in our region, and the risks of war between the US and China.

This is the second episode in our two part series examining rising geopolitical tensions between the world’s superpowers.

It’s Tuesday February 22

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RUBY:

Hugh, yesterday on the show we discussed the crisis in Ukraine, and what it demonstrated about the rising tensions between the US and Russia. You and I have spoken before about similar rising tensions in the Pacific, between the US and China. So I wonder if you see parallels between those two situations. What do they tell us about America’s place in the world right now?

HUGH:

Well I think there's a very strong analogy between what's happening between Russia and America in the Ukraine and what's happening between Russia and China in East Asia, and particularly in relation to Taiwan.

In both cases, America faces a local great power Russia in Eastern Europe, China in East Asia that seeks to establish its own sphere of influence in its own backyard. And in doing that, it's trying to challenge America's position and really essentially to push America out.

Now Putin is trying to push America out of Ukraine in the first instance, make it clear that Ukraine cannot become a US ally. That's what his whole push is about. And he's shown that he is willing to go to war in order to enforce that. And the Americans have shown Biden has shown that he's not willing to go to war to stop it. He's willing to talk tough. He's willing to put on economic sanctions, but he's not willing to fight. And that asymmetry between Russia being willing to fight over Ukraine and America not being willing to fight is a very significant index of the shifting balance of military power and strategic influence.

And I think we're seeing the same kind of thing happening in East Asia, where it's becoming clear that America no longer has the maritime preponderance that it used to enjoy, and it can no longer expect to win a war with China over Taiwan quickly and cheaply and cleanly.

RUBY:

Hmm. OK. And so why then do you think this particular conflict is escalating now? Because it seems like 20 years ago, China would not have taken on the US, but things have shifted in recent years, and now it seems China at least believes that it would have the possibility of of winning a conflict like this. So what has changed?

HUGH:

Well, I think it's a really important question because for a very long time after, you know, Richard Nixon went to China and met Mao Tse Tung in 1972

Archival tape -- Richard Nixon:

“This magnificent banquet marks the end of our stay and the People's Republic of China. We have been here a week. This was the week that changed the world.”

HUGH:

and Deng Xiaoping began to open China up and and and liberalise it at least economically in the early 1980s.

Archival tape -- Documentary:

“China's economy has grown faster than that of any other major country. Once poor and underdeveloped, the Asian giant has now grown into one of the most important export markets for manufacturers from all over the world”

HUGH:

We've seen a long period in which China and America have been very careful to get on well with one another.

Archival tape -- Ronald Raegan:

“We can cooperate in some of the modernisation that is going on in industry in the People's Republic. And they in turn, well, the benefits would be mutual.”

HUGH:

And that was primarily because the Chinese took the decision that even though I think they were never happy with the idea of America as the dominant power in their own backyard, they realised that they weren't strong enough to compete with America

Archival tape -- Ronald Raegan:

“I think the future in trade and development for both of us holds out a great promise for our people”

HUGH:

and that their own capacity to grow their economies and develop their societies depended on being able to get on well with the United States.

Now what we have seen in the last decade, in particular under Xi Jinping, is that China has moved past that. They now are claiming leadership in East Asia, and the reason for that switch is perfectly straightforward. China has now grown so strong that it no longer believes it needs the United States, and it no longer believes it needs to fear the United States.

And so I think there's a sense of inevitability that once China became strong enough to challenge the United States, it was going to want to do that to assert its position as the leading power in its own backyard.

Now we might regret that, but we can't be surprised by it because it's in China. Doing that is very much doing what great powers always do, and what America does in its own hemisphere.

You know, America claims to be has been for nearly 200 years, the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, in its own hemisphere, and China really just wants the same for itself.

RUBY:

Right, so China wants dominance in the region. But what would it actually look like if it tried to assert that? Obviously, we don’t know exactly how the US would respond, but let's say it chooses to defend Taiwan. Then what happens?

HUGH:

Yes. Well, a really critical question that often gets overlooked when people start talking about war is not just will the war start, but how will it go? How will it end? Who will win?

And what strikes me as a really significant and really worrying about the possibility of a US-China conflict over Taiwan is that this is not a war that either side can win. The forces, in a sense, are two evenly balanced. And it's also a war that could very easily escalate into a very large war indeed. I mean, the first level it could escalate into a very large conventional war. And it is worth bearing in mind in that regard that this is the first time we've seen the potential for really since the Second World War, a full scale war between two major powers.

And that's what would make a US-China war distinctive. These are the two strongest countries in the world. Once they go to war with one another, it's very likely to get very big, very quickly.

And the second part of that is that even worse than a really large scale conventional war with all the implications that has is the, I think, very real risk that that war could go nuclear.

RUBY:

We’ll be back in a moment

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RUBY:

Hugh, we're talking about the battle for influence in Asia, it seems the U.S. is reluctant to vacate and and let China exert power in its place, but I wonder what is it exactly that the U.S. is fighting for now? It's been three decades since the Cold War ended. Why does the U.S. still want influence in this region?

HUGH:

Look, it's a really good question, and I think it's one that we need to focus on more carefully than we have hitherto, because for a long time, it's not very easy to assume that, you know, America wants to be the global leading power because that's what America is. And that seemed quite natural at the end of the Cold War.

Archival tape -- Anchor:

“To our top story - The Iron Curtain between East Germany and West Berlin has come tumbling down. East Germany announced today that it is opening its borders, allowing its citizens to go anywhere they wish”

HUGH:

You know, it's important to remember back to those moments in the 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Archival tape -- Gorbachev:

“I am ceasing my activities in the post of president of the USSR”

Archival tape -- Reporter:

“The tricoloured banner of the Russian Republic now flies over the Kremlin”

HUGH:

America had apparently emerged as the overwhelmingly dominant power globally on every dimension of national strength economically, technologically, culturally, soft power, militarily .

And so people started getting used to in the 1990s and passed it on to the early years of this century, to the idea that America was simply unchallengeable globally and we'd live in an American dominated world.

Archival tape -- Anchor:

“Well, it's been 14 years in the making, and today finally, McDonald's threw open the doors to its first restaurant in Moscow”

HUGH:

And I think that for many Americans and for many outside America, that was a very attractive model and certainly more attractive than some of the alternatives. And I think a lot of people in America, at least a lot of people in Washington, D.C., are still very attracted to that vision of global leadership and for that vision of global leadership,

And for that vision of global leadership, of unchallenged American global leadership to be sustained. America must remain the dominant power in East Asia in the western Pacific because that is the world's most dynamic and indeed its richest region for America can't dominate in Asia. It can't play that role globally.

And so I think the the imperatives in terms of, so to speak, the old expectations of America's global and regional role to try and hang on to that position are very strong.

RUBY:

Right so, is this about the U.S. clinging to an outdated Cold War mindset, when the situation has changed so dramatically, in terms of their power in the region?

HUGH:

Yeah, look, that's that's precisely right. The fact is that the vision of American unchallengeable power globally which so-to-speak underpinned that post-Cold War vision of America's role in the world in which I think still continues to be very influential in Washington, D.C. that just turned out to be wrong. The fact is that America doesn't have the biggest economy in the world anymore. China does. Its political system and its vision of a global order is not accepted by countries around the world are very important. Countries like Russia and China and important countries in the Middle East don't accept American leadership and are contesting it.

And what's more, the Americans have found, particularly on the military front, that its armed forces not as effortlessly preponderant as they had imagined. I mean, I discovered in the Middle East, in Iraq and of course, in Afghanistan that despite massive efforts and enormous expenditure, America cannot necessarily achieve the strategic objectives it set itself.

And so I think what we're seeing is the United States or at least the US leadership. People in Washington are still clinging to a vision of a US global role, which it no longer has the capacity to sustain. And that's what people in Washington, D.C. are committed to. That old vision of American leadership is not clear that the American people at large.

I think people can exaggerate the significance of Donald Trump in this particular respect. But one significant thing about Trump was that he did have a very isolationist perspective. America First was partly about America stepping back from that role of global leadership, which the Orthodox politicians on both sides of the US political aisle have tended to support for so long.

And I think Biden, too, in his own way, is quite an isolationist. He talks about America being back and restoring American leadership. But if we actually look at what Biden has done since he became president, this looks to me like a man whose overwhelming focus is on domestic imperatives and the withdrawal from Afghanistan being one example of a president who is very reluctant to put the commitment of American wealth and resources and energy and so on to solving problems overseas when he sees such enormous problems at home in the United States itself.

RUBY:

Mm hmm. And just finally, Hugh, I wonder what you make of the relationship between Xi Jinping and Putin right now? We know that they met during the Winter Olympics, and they. Released this long statement together, so what do we know about how close they are? And do you think that we are about to see a new era of strategic cooperation between them?

HUGH:

Look, I think there is a very significant alignment of strategic interests and objectives between Russia and China at the moment because they are both trying to do in their own backyards. The same thing that is, they're both trying to challenge America's dominant position in their own backyard. They're both hoping that the United States can be encouraged to step back and leave them as the leading power in their own spheres of influence and their objectives reinforce one another. I think Xi Jinping's hopes that he can push America out of East Asia by persuading deterring the United States from defending Taiwan have been reinforced by the fact that Biden has decided that he's not willing to fight for Ukraine and vice versa, so each of them benefit from the challenge that the other poses to America in their respective backyard. So I think that alignment of interests and objectives is very significant.

On the other hand, I think there's a very clear limit to it. I think in the long run, China and Russia are very close neighbours. They're both very big countries. They're both very dangerous countries. And neither of them is going to want to be dominated by the other. I think some people fear that Russia and China will forge a really deep alignment sort of alliance and that will face China and Russia cooperating together to dominate the world. I don't see that because I think in particular, I think Russia will be extremely careful never to allow itself to be dominated by China. So I think if and when they achieve their objectives in their respective regions, and I think they probably will. China and Russia will again become very natural strategic rivals.

RUBY:

Thank you Hugh, for talking to us about all of this.

HUGH:

It's my great pleasure.

RUBY:

You can read Hugh White’s essay on China and Taiwan in the latest issue of Australian Foreign Affairs.

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RUBY:

Also in the news today

The NSW Transport minister has accused the Rail, Tram and Bus Union of ‘terrorist like activity.’ after Sydney's train network ground to a halt on Monday, leaving commuters stranded.

The union planned to carry out low-level industrial action but said union members were ready and willing to work, and accused the state government of shutting down the rail network.

The industrial dispute between the union and the NSW government is over a number of issues, including concerns about privatisation and worker safety.

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And health authorities have warned parents to stop using three brands of baby formula which may be contaminated.

The formula brands EleCare, Similac and Alimentum have been recalled after concerns were raised that the products could be contaminated with bacteria that can be fatal in infants.

I’m Ruby Jones, this is 7am, see you tomorrow.